If the asset market is incomplete, and if there are two or more consumption goods in each state of nature, then for fixed consumer preferences (of at least two agents), and fixed (non-trivial) technologies for the firm(s), and for a generic assignment of initial endowments, competitive equilibrium investment decisions are constrained inefficient. An outside agency can, simply by redirecting the investment decisions of firms and by lump sum transfers to individuals before the state of nature is realized, make all consumers better off.
Introduction
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We would also like to thank participants at the theory workshop at the University of Pennsylvania, at the IMSSS Summer Workshop (1987) at Stanford University and at the Bonn Workshop in Mathematical Economics (Bowo 88) for helpful comments. This paper is a shortened version of MRG Working paper M873.5, Department of Economics, University of Southern California, October 1987. there is no relative price effect and hence no effect on welfare. But when there are two or more goods and markets are incomplete, agents' vectors of marginal utilities of income are generically not collinear and such a relative price change has an effect on welfare. It is as if a planner by foreseeing these price changes had an additional instrument for redistributing income across the states which is not available to the more myopic competitive system.
To exhibit this pecuniary externality as a general phenomenon we need a concept of equilibrium for an economy with production in which the structure of markets is incomplete. Since shareholders' vectors of marginal utilities of income are not collinear, the concept of profit maximisation is, in the case of general technology sets, ambiguous. Several criteria have been proposed. Since we are interested in normative properties we adopt the criterion introduced by Dreze (1974) . In the one-good case this leads to equilibria which satisfy the first-order conditions for constrained efficiency. It will be clear from our analysis, however, that the generic inefficiency result can be expected to hold for a much broader class of objective functions provided that firms behave as price takers on the spot markets. It should also be noted that the inefficiency result holds even if securities other than the equity of firms are introduced provided the overall asset structure remains incomplete.
Intuitive as the basic economic result may appear, establishing it in a general equilibrium framework is technically demanding. This was already clear from the earlier analysis of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) who studied the case of an exchange economy (exogenously given asset structure). They showed that under certain conditions for a generic choice of utility functions and endowments all equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient. The basic idea that underlies their proof is that changes in portfolio holdings lead to changes in relative prices if agents have different marginal propensities to consume. In this paper we do not rely on differences in the propensities to consume (and hence perturbations of the utility functions) since changes in production alter the supplies of commodities and thereby induce changes in relative prices. Our results thus depend only on genericity in endowments.
In section 2 we lay out the basic stock market economy. In section 3 in addition to existence (Theorem 1) we establish two important structural properties of equilibria: first that the equilibria are generically smooth functions of the endowment parameters (Theorem 2), and second that the present value coefficients of consumers (the normalized vectors of marginal utilities of income) are generically distinct (Proposition 3). These two results are basic to the proofs of the two generic inefftciency results (Theorems 3, 4) in section 4. In section 5 the nature of the inefficiency is illustrated through an example. The proofs of the main results are given in section 6 and the appendix.
The stock market economy
In this section we outline a general equilibrium model of a stock market economy in which the security markets are incomplete. As indicated above, our objective is to show that when the markets are incomplete serious questions are raised about the ability of the stock market to induce an appropriate allocation of investment. To analyse the problem in a framework that is at the same time simple but general we consider a two-period (t = 0,l) economy in which there is uncertainty about the state of nature at date 1.
Utility functions, technology sets and initial endowments
There are 121 consumers (i=l,...,Z), 521 firms (j=l,...,J) and Szl states of nature (s= 1,. . . , S) at date 1. For convenience we include t = 0 as a state and write s=O,l,..., S. In each state s there are L goods (I= 1,. . . , L); we let N =L(S+ 1) denote the total number of goods, so that RN is the basic real commodity space in the model.
Each consumer has an initial endowment of goods wi =(w~)~=, E RN,, where wf = (w;,);= 1 E RL, is the vector of goods in state s, and chooses a vector of consumption x~=(x~)~=,E RN,. It is convenient to write x'=(xb, xi) E RL, x RTL where xb is date 0 consumption and xi, =(xi)f= 1 is the vector of date I consumption across the states. Without loss of generality we assume that each consumer's preference ordering over consumption bundles can be represented by a utility function u':Ry -+R. We make the following set of assumptions on each agent's utility function and endowment: the first part is used to establish existence of an equilibrium, the second part is added to analyse the generic properties of an equilibrium, the third is used to establish generic inefficiency.
Assumption A (utility functions). (1) Each
consumer's utility function ui: RN, -+ R is continuous, quasi-concave and strictly monotone in good 1 in each state s=O,..., S and each agent's initial endowment wi is strictly positive, wi E RN, + .
Each utility function u' is separable in date 0 and date 1 consumption, that is, there exist utility functions ub:R$ -+R, u';:R~~-+R such that u'(x)= &(xo)+ui,(x,)VxER~,i=l ,..., I.
On the production side of the economy, each firm j is characterised by a technology set Yjc RN and the directors of the firm choose a production plan yj~ Yj. We use the standard convention for the production vector yj= (yS)f=, where yS=(yjJf= 1 is the vector of goods produced in state s: if y,, < 0( > 0) then good I is used in state s as an input (is produced in state s as an output). In the subsequent analysis we will often find it convenient to decompose the production activity of firm j into period 0 and period 1 components, yj= (y',, yi) = (y',, (yi)f= 1). In addition to the standard closure and convexity assumptions on the technology sets we need two additional properties to be able to analyse the generic properties of an equilibrium: the first is an appropriate parametrisation of these sets, the second is the assumption that they have smooth boundaries.
To obtain genericity results we need a natural way of parametrising the decisions of agents in the economy. The consumption-portfolio decision of consumers is naturally parametrised by the vector of initial endowments o=(w',. . . , w') ERY'+ of the I consumers. To parametrise the production activity of each firm we assume that the production of each firm consists of two components, the endogenously chosen yje Yj and an exogenously given vector of outputs $C RN,, so that the total production of firm j is yj+#. We call qj the initial endowment vector of firm j and let r] =(ul,. . . , #). To obtain genericity results we parametrise the decisions of consumers and producers by initial endowment vectors (w,n) in the open set RN:, x RTJ+.
In order to obtain a smooth supply function we assume that the boundary 8Yj of Yj is a smooth submanifold of a subspace Kjc RN. The introduction of the subspace Kj avoids the otherwise restrictive assumption that all goods are involved in the production activity of firm j. The two sets of assumptions on the technology sets of firms that we will use are the following.
Assumption B (technology sets).
(1) (i) Each firm's technology set Yjc RN is closed, convex and OE Yj. (ii) (I!= I wi + cf= 1 (Yj+ nj)) n R: is compact. (2) (i) Let K' be a kj-dimensional subspace of RN with 15 kjs N for j=l , . . . , J. Yjc Kj is a kj-dimensional manifold and its boundary 3Yj is a 5~7~ manifold with strictly positive Gaussian curvature at each point. (ii) njERy+, j=l,..., J.
If we choose utility functions (u'), production sets (Yj) and a vector of initial endowments (o,~]), satisfying Assumptions (A,B), then we obtain an economy a((~', Y'),o, n). In the analysis that follows we think of the utility functions and technology sets as being fixed and allow the parameters (w, q) to be free to vary in the parameter space RN,'vJ).
Market structure: Spot and security markets
There are a variety of market structures that can be added to any such economy a((~', Yj), o, q) to induce an allocation of resources. The classical one is the Arrow-Debreu set of complete contingent markets and with such a market structure (competitive) equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal. Our basic tenet is that such a market structure is essentially not observed in the real world, certainly not for the important aggregate risks to which the production activity of firms is exposed. It presupposes much too refined a system of markets.
A much more realistic market structure can be described generally as follows. There are two types of markets, spot markets for the trading of real good and financial markets for trading financial assets. A rich class of market structures can be analysed depending on the type of financial assets introduced. In this paper we consider only one type of financial asset, namely the security or equity issued by a firm. We focus our attention on this case for several reasons. First and foremost in terms of the sheer magnitude of trade involved, equity markets are perhaps the most significant risk-sharing markets that exist in a modern economy and they are of central importance in influencing the production (investment) decisions of firms. Second, adding additional asset markets would not alter our main result, provided the resulting asset structure remains incomplete. Finally, adding additional asset markets substantially complicates the notation and our interest is in obtaining the simplest framework for proving the main result.
Consider therefore a market structure consisting of spot and equity markets. In each state s = 0,. . . , S there is a spot market for each of the L goods; let p= (po,pl)=(pO,(pS) f= 1) denote the associated vector of spot prices. There are security markets for the shares of each firm j. Implicit in the ownership share 050'js 1 of firm j by agent i is the right to receive the share 19'jyj .of the production plan of firm j. However, since the security market is viewed as a financial market on which income is delivered rather than as a real market on which goods are delivered, we assume that what agent i receives as a result of purchasing at date 0 the proportion 8" of firm j's shares is the income 8'j p 0 yj where p 0 y'=(p,y~)fzO. The price (market value) of firm j is qj so that the cost df purchasing 8" is Bijqj. Each agent i has an initial ownership share OsS'js 1 cf firm j; he thus receives @qj from the sale of his initial shares and spends Q'jq, for the purchase of new shares.' Since we are interested in the idea that ownership also implies some control over firm j's production decision, we assume that securities cannot be shortsold (0'jzO) . Trading in the shares of the J firms by the I consumers thus gives rise to an I x J non-negative matrix 8=(8", i= 1,. . . , I, j= 1,. . . ,J) each of whose columns sum to 1, c!=l 8'j= 1, j= 1,. . . ,J. Let q= (ql,. . . ,qJ) denote the vector of security prices, then given the market prices (p,q) For this budget set to be well-defined we need to assume that each agent correctly anticipates at date 0, the date 1 spot prices p1 and the outputs of
The reader will object that the assumption of correct point anticipations is unrealistic: but recall that it adds strength to our inefficiency results, since biased or dispersed anticipations will not in general improve efficiency.
Present value coefficients
Consumer i seeks a consumption bundle which solves the constrained maximum problem max Ui (xi), i=l ) . . . ) I. x'eB '(p,q,y;o,q) This is a standard Kuhn-Tucker problem in which the (S+ 1) spot market expenditure constraints give rise to a vector of marginal utilities of income (Lagrange multipliers), 
Proof.
Consider the preferred and affordable sets
Since Pin B'=@ by the standard separation theorem there exists ai E RLCs+", zli #O such that SUP<~,~' 0i.5ilinfsiEPiui.<i.
Since OEPnB' In the analysis that follows these present value coefficients summarise the essentially new aspects of the problem of resource allocation that arise on the consumer side of the economy when markets are incomplete.
We shall now show how these coefficients can be used on the production side of the economy to define an objective function for the firm in the presence of incomplete markets.
The problem of defining present value of profit
Given the prices of real goods determined on the spot markets and the market value of each firm determined on the equity markets, column j of the matrix W gives the vector of returns across the states s=O, 1,. . . , S obtained from the ownership of firm j when its production decision and initial endowment are yj+$. To simplify the motivation of the objective function, in this section we drop the no-short-sales restriction 8"zO. Then the present value coefficient of agent i is a vector rci=( 1, rci) =(l,(nf)~,,) ERR: which satisfies the no-arbitrage equation (2) where V(p,; y, +v],) = [pi 0 (yi +~{)]3= 1 is the S x J submatrix of period 1 returns from the J firms. When J 5 S then rank V 5.l and the dimension of the set of solutions of (2) Ekern and Wilson (1974) and Radner (1974) ]. The idea of spanning is that firms find themselves in a market environment in which no single firm can by itself alter the spanning opportunities available on the market as a whole. To express this idea let the initial endowment vector of each firm be zero so that ?=(ul' , . . . , qJ) =0 and let (IQ,, jj,)) denote the subspace of RS spanned by the columns of the matrix I/. Then the spanning condition requires that for any new production plan yje Yj of firm j, the profit stream that it generates at date 1, pi 0 yi, can be written as a linear combination of the existing profit streams (pl q j$){, 1 of all firms so that With this assumption firm j cannot create any new spanning opportunities for investors by altering its production plan yj. In this case the market value of the firm for each alternative production plan can be evaluated in terms of the market values of all firms at the existing production plan jj, and market value maximisation gives a well-defined objective function for the firm.
As soon as a firm can create a date 1 profit stream PI 0 y{ which does not lie in the subspace ( V(pI, j?,)), investors will not in general agree on the value to be assigned to this production plan and the spanning approach breaks down. Whether the spanning condition is a reasonable approximation to what we observe on security markets is an empirical question that we shall not enter into here. Suffice it to note that spanning rules out disagreement among shareholders and to that extent is not generally observed. Furthermore, if the number of firms (J) is small relative to the number of states of nature (S) then the spanning assumption is likely to be very restrictive. The problem is thus to extend the definition of the objective function of a firm to a market environment in which the spanning condition no longer holds. We will examine a variety of ways in which this can be done by considering a class of objective functions which reduce to market value maximisation when the spanning condition holds.
What needs to be added to determine an objective function for firm j is a present value coefficient /3j= (1, pi,. . . , p',) satisfying the no-arbitrage eq. (2). Thus one way of arriving at an equilibrium concept is to choose a collection of such pj coefficients, one for each firm,
and have each firm maximise the present value of its profit,
If we view a firm as an entity that makes decisions in the interests of its shareholders then if the present value /I' chosen by the directors offirm j does not reflect some kind of median or average of the prevent value coefficients of its shareholders then its production decision may be 'rejected' by the shareholders. In short there may be a breakdown of the relation between ownership and control. To avoid such 'instability' two criteria have been proposed. These criteria reflect the fact that in the two-period economy there are two groups of shareholders, the new (O'j) shareholders and the original (6'j) shareholders. Thus Dreze (1974) proposed that ,@ should be the average present value coefficient of the firm's new shareholders, pi= i @jni, j=l,...,J, i=l while Grossman and Hart (1979) proposed that /?j be the average present value coefficient of the firm's original shareholders pj = ij iY-fn', j=l ,*.*, J.
The distinction between these two criteria is far from trivial and a discussion of the issues would take us beyond the confines of this paper.' Note, however, that in a two-period economy the new shareholders criterion has better normative properties since it takes into account the interests of the shareholders who will receive its stream of profits. Indeed, in the one-good case, it is the only criterion which satisfies the first-order conditions for constrained Pareto optimality. It seems reasonable therefore in extending the analysis of the normative properties of equilibrium to the multi-good case to adopt the new as opposed to the original shareholder criterion. It should be clear more generally that if in the multi-good case the equilibrium allocations induced by the new shareholder criterion (5) are generically constrained suboptimal, then the same should be true for any criterion satisfying (3) and (4).
Shareholder constrained efficiency
If each firm adopts the new shareholder criterion outlined above, in what sense is the resulting collective set of decisions of firms made in the best interests of shareholders in the economy? Is the production sector induced to act in the best interests of the group of shareholders? 
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such that
%rossman and Hart came up with their criterion in attempting to resolve the difficulties that appear when the Drtze criterion is applied to an economy with three or more periods. For then the new shareholders at date 1 may differ from the new shareholders at date 0: shareholders planning to sell at date 1 are concerned with the selling price of the shares, while those who will hang on to their shares are interested in the dividends (profits) that will accrue. The criterion of Grossman and Hart focuses all attention on the original shareholders at date 0. This, however, is reasonable only if the investment decisions made at date 0 are not reversible by subsequent shareholders, an assumption that ultimately becomes untenable.
Definition 3. Let (X,8, y; ~5) denote actions of the agents and a vector of spot prices. The vector of production plans jj is shareholder constrained efficient at (2, B,p) if there does not exist another vector of production plans y= (Y' ,..., yJ) with YEYj, j=l,..., J, which is preferred to jj at (2, iI,p) by the shareholders of all firms.
Remark. The idea behind this definition is that if jj were not optimal for the shareholders then a meeting of shareholders could be convened in which those interested in changing production plans could 'buy' the votes of others to obtain unanimity for a change from jj to some y. If we restrict the change in production plans to a single firm, say firm j, holding the production plans of all other firms fixed and setting tii' =O, j' # j, i = 1,. . . , I, then with the above definitions we may say that j7-j is firm j shareholder constrained efficient. In this case the above meeting of shareholders is restricted to the shareholders of firm j. This type of constrained efficiency holds with A(,,. To show that the vector of production plans jj is optimal in the broader sense of Definition 3, so that simultaneous changes in the production decisions of all firms are permitted, we need to ensure that no two firms jfk choose different present value coefficients (rc:#ni) for any agent i. This is ensured by 42,. 
If we multiply (7) and (8) The assumption that each firm uses the profit maximising criterion (10) implies that each firm behaves competitively in that it takes spot prices as given and independent of its production decision. When markets are incomplete this has important consequences as we shall see in section 4.
Equilibrium
With the objective function (10) assigned to each firm our model becomes closed and we are led to the following concept of equilibrium for a stock market economy. (iv) ii1 P= 1, j=l ,**., J.
We now establish some properties of this concept of equilibrium which besides their intrinsic interest are necessary to prove the generic inefficiency of equilibrium. The proofs of all the theorems that follow are collected in section 6 and the appendix.
Theorem I (existence of equilibrium).
Under the assumptions (A(,,, Bo,) the economy a((~', Yj), (co, n)) has an equilibrium.
To carry out a qualitative analysis we need equilibria to be smooth functions of the parameters (w,n). It is at this point that the smoothness assumptions (A(,,, I$,,) on preferences and technology are introduced. Even with these assumptions there are three types of degeneracy that can prevent an equilibrium from being a smooth function of the parameters (o 2 n) E RN,"= J). Degeneracy occurs if any of the following holds:
(a) the matrix of security returns I/=[& q (y1+rl1)] is degenerate in that its rank is p<J; (b) equilibrium prices are such that for some agent i the no-short-sales constraint just begins to be binding and the portfolio choice 8' is not a differentiable function of the prices; (c) the parameter value (w,~) is a critical value of the projection from the equilibrium manifold onto the parameter space.
Theorem 2 below shows that the parameter values for which such nonsmoothness can occur are exceptional in the sense that they form a closed set of measure zero in the parameter space RyC$+J'. Remark. A comment is in order regarding the assumption I+ JsS+ 1. For general technology sets (Yj) the coefficient fij=xf= 1 @xi of each firm j depends non-trivially on the portfolios (@)f= 1 of its shareholders. When rank W = p <J agents' portfolio choices (0') are typically indeterminate and this can lead to indeterminacy of the equilibrium. To be sure that this happens only exceptionally we need to limit the number of agents (I+ J) relative to the number of states (S+ 1). We will show in section 4 that if the technology sets are restricted to ray technologies then this assumption is not necessary, since the production decisions of the firms no longer depend on the distribution of ownership. In this case the matrix W is generically of maximal rank independent of the number of agents.
The key characteristic of equilibria with incomplete markets is that the dimension of the set of solutions of the no-arbitrage equation rci W= 0 is S-J >O. This suggests the likelihood that in equilibrium agents' present value coefficients will be distinct: the next proposition asserts that this property is generic. This result is a basic step in establishing the generic inefficiency theorem of section 4. Note that when I + J SS + 1 if we require that II 2 then J <S must hold. 
Inefficiency of equilibrium
In this section we will examine the efficiency properties of the stock market equilibrium introduced in section 3. It is clear that there are many market structures that can be adjoined to the basic production economy of section 2.1 to induce an allocation of resources and the efficiency properties of equilibrium allocations will depend upon the market structure introduced. If the market structure consists of a system of spot markets and a sufficient number of asset markets (JZS) then equilibrium allocations are generically efficient [see Magi11 and Shafer (1990) ]. The situation changes dramatically when asset-markets are incomplete (J <S) for then equilibrium allocations are generically not even constrained efficient. This result was established by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) for the case of an exchange economy. The object of this section is to show how this result can be extended to the case of a production economy. Note that we do not attempt to answer the important question of why asset markets are incomplete: we leave the explanation of this for subsequent research.
The basic objective behind theorems of this kind is to determine whether decentralised decision making based on prices leads to an efficient coordination of decisions by the agents in the economy. Zf a decentralised price system does not lead to an efficient co-ordination of decisions then presumably some form of government intervention is called for: this is a basic theme that underlies our analysis of equilibrium in a production economy with incomplete markets. In this paper, however, we will not attempt to explore what form such government intervention should take.
The problem of defining efficienq
Government intervention suggests the idea of a planner running the economy. If we allow the planner access to the standard feasible allocations then we arrive at the concept of Pareto efficiency. When markets are incomplete it is clear why equilibrium allocations are generically Pareto inefficient: a planner allocating resources with access to the standard feasible allocations is given much more freedom to allocate resources across states than is provided by the system of spot and financial markets. Thus, when markets are incomplete the concept of Pareto efficiency is no longer relevant: it does not allow us to determine whether the existing structure of incomplete markets is used efficiently.
What is needed is clear. The planner must only be permitted access to a constrained set of feasible allocations which mimics the opportunities that a system of spot and financial markets offers for redistributing goods across the states of nature. In the one-good case (L= 1) the concept of constrained efficiency is immediate and is that introduced by Diamond (1967) and DrZze (1974) . When there are many goods (Lz2) the problem of finding the appropriate concept is more subtle. The concept introduced by Grossman (1977) and Grossman and Hart (1979) is not the appropriate criterion for judging whether a system of incomplete markets is being used efficiently. Under their criterion, which we refer to as weak constrained efficiency, every equilibrium allocation is efficient, even one which is Pareto dominated by another and such an equilibrium is clearly not making the best use of the existing structure of markets.3
We shall now introduce the appropriate criterion which is a generalisation 3Weak constrained efficiency considers a restricted set of reallocations about an existing equilibrium ((X,0, j), (a q, $). Reallocations on the financial markets and spot markets are kept completely separate. Thus when shareholders portfolios are changed (do') each agent is obliged to 'consume' the bundle of commodities c$=, dO'j7 to which the new portfolio holdings give him the right: agent i is not allowed to sell this newly acquired bundle of goods on the spot markets. The reason is clear: if they allowed such newly acquired bundles induced by portfolio changes to be exchanged on the spot markets then spot prices would in general need to be changed. This is precisely the effect that weak constrained efficiency eliminates but constrained eflciency (as defined below) introduces. Constrained efficiency differs in another important respect from weak constrained efficiency in that simultaneous changes in the portfolios and production plans are permitted. of the one introduced by Stiglitz (1982) and that studied by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) for the case of a pure exchange asset market economy.4 In a nutshell, a planner can determine portfolios (e), production plans (y) and income transfers (t) at date 0; consumption (x) is then determined through the spot markets at an appropriate market clearing price (p). More precisely, Definition 6. A plan ((x, p), (z,O, y) ) is constrained feasible (or feasible for a constrained planner) if and spot markets clear,
iil(xi-wi)= i (v'+t$). j=l --A plan ((x,p),(?,@,J))
is constrained efficient if it is constrained feasible and there does not exist a constrained feasible plan ((x,p),(z, 0,~)) such that ui(xi) > u'(X'), i = 1 ,. . . ,I. An allocation which is not constrained efficient is called constrained inefficient.
First-order conditions for efficiency
Let spot prices at date 0 be normalised so that pOl = 1. Then the transfer payment zi can be considered as a transfer of good 1. Thus when a planner chooses a triple (r, 8,~) this is equivalent to choosing a virtual endowment in goods, 41n Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) the set of constrained feasible allocations was further limited since transfers at time zero were not allowed, that is. it was required that there be 9 such that r'=q.(6'-Q'),i= I,..., I.
~'=w'+(y+tj)ei+z'eo, i= l)...) I,
for each consumer, where e0 =( LO,. . . , 0) E RN. Eq.( 12) can be viewed as the initial endowments of an exchange economy a((~'), 0) where Q = (ly', . . . , a'), for which consumption is allocated through a system of spot markets. 
jl G'(P9 P OH/)-1y)=O.
If the economy b((u'),~~) is regular at 0 then the price system p(g) is locally a differentiable function of the parameter o,.
----
Consider a constrained feasible plan ((x,p) , (z,8, y) ) then Xi =?(p, p 0 ly'), i=l ,. . .,Z,p=fi(g) with w =(wl,. . ., y') defined by (12). We want to examine the effect of a marginal change (dr, de, dy) in the plan i.e., a change satisfying
Such a change induces a marginal change in the virtual endowments, dw' = (y + r~) de' + dye'+ dzieO, i=l Z ,..., 7 which in turn leads to a marginal change in consumption and spot prices (d$dfi). The latter adjust so that Pnd~'=podly'-dp"o(x'-w')+dz'E,, i=l I. ,*.., The resulting change in utility for agent i is given by 
The following lemma is now evident.
Lemma. Let ((X,~$(T, 0,~)) b e a constrained feasible plan, then there exists a
marginal change (dr, de, dy) satisfying (14) such that du'> 0, i = 1,. . . ,I, if and only if x;= 1 (du'/X$ > 0.
Since p/z0 = C', dividing (15) by 2; and summing over i gives the marginal change in social welfare arising from the change (dr,de,dy),
The term zf= r CL dj?, (Z~--&) vanishes since r&, = 1 for all i and If= ,(_Cb -lyb) =O. The first two terms in (16) represent the direct income effect of the change (dB,dy), the last term is the indirect price effect.
A shareholder equilibrium ((X,8, j), (p, q, 5)) is clearly a constrained feasible plan corresponding to (T, 0,~) =((6 -I'?)& 8, j). Let us examine the marginal effect on social welfare (16) arising from a marginal change (dr, d0,dy) around such an equilibrium. Evaluating such a marginal change is legitimate since we prove in Proposition 5 in the appendix that the virtual endowments induced by an equilibrium are generically regular. The first-order conditions for the portfolio choice 8' of agent i implies that there exist $jzO such that 
The first term --pd8 measures the cost of the no-short-sales constraints B'jzO. This term is zero in an equilibrium where 8'j>OVi, j. The second term is the effect on welfare of a change in the equilibrium spot prices. The price function fi is a function of cc, which is in turn a function of the planners action (z,8, y). With a slight abuse of notation we let fi also denote the composite function (z,Q, y)+o-+fi. If we make the separability assumptions AC3) then the period 1 spot price function PI depends only on CU, and hence only on (O,yl). Let @,/@j and @,/ayi, denote the partial derivatives of the vector valued function fil with respect to 8'j and yj,, respectively. These are both column vectors. Thus @,/ayj, denotes the SL x SL matrix Since the price effect dj, decomposes into the change induced by d6' and the change induced by dy, applying the lemma to (17) gives the following necessary conditions for constrained efficiency. We refer to (i) as the portfolio eficiency condition and (ii) as the production efficiency condition. Two important cases where both efficiency conditions are
satisfied are the following:
There is only one good in each state (L= 1). (i) and (ii) hold since the price effects vanish. Thus the first-order conditions are satisfied. Since in the case of ray technologies, the set of feasible allocations is convex, the first-order conditions are sufficient. In this special case every equilibrium allocation is con&rained efficient. This is the original result of Diamond (1967) . In the case of general technology sets studied by Dreze (1974) the set of feasible allocations is non-conuex and the first-order conditions are no longer sufficient. Dreze in fact gives examples of equilibria with one good which are not constrained efficient.
The present value coefficients are all the same (77; =n,,i= 1,. . .,I). This happens if asset markets are complete (JZS and rank W =S) and the constraints B'jzO are not binding. Proposition 3 asserts that when asset markets are incomplete this case will not be observed. In addition there are two special cases where (i) and (ii) will hold. There is no exchange at equilibrium (Xi, -wi = 0, i = 1,. . . , I). In the pure exchange case this occurs if initial endowments are Pareto optimal, a situation which is not generic.
There is no production and all agents have identical income effects (additively separable preferences across the stares with the same homorhetic utility function within each stare). The price effects disappear in (i). Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) have shown that this is indeed true. In order to eliminate case (d) the genericity is with respect to utility functions as well as endowments. Our object there is to extend the result to the case of an economy with production: in particular we will show that the production efficiency condition (ii) is generically not satisfied, the genericity being with respect to the endowments (a,~). Thus even tf portfolios were efficiently allocated, it is unlikely that production decisions are eficient.
The general message that lies behind the inefficiency theorems that we prove in the next section seems clear. A modern corporation serves three constituencies, its shareholders, its employees and the consumers. In this paper we have not taken into account the responsibility of a corporation to its employees.' The firm thus serves shareholders by distributing profits and consumers by producing commodities purchasable on the spot markets. By eq. (16), a change in its production plan (dyj) affects their welfare via two terms, When a firm adopts the criterion (10) the welfare of shareholders is correctly taken into account, so that the first term vanishes. If the system of markets ensures that the 7ti coefficients of agents are equalised (complete markets) then the second term automatically vanishes and the firm serves its two constituencies (at least locally) optimally. When markets are incomplete the interests of the two constituencies are in general in conflict: the theorems below show that the two terms cannot in general be made to vanish simultaneously. If a firm is to act according to some social welfare criterion then it must strike a balance between the interests of shareholders and consumers. This suggests the need to modify the criterion of the firm to suitably take into account the interests of consumers (and more generally of employees) -a result perhaps achievable by some form of government intervention.
From a policy point of view (i.e., should the government intervene or not) the significance of the inefficiency theorems which follow depends upon the magnitude of the distortions which they assert are generically present at an equilibrium. We do not attempt to provide estimates of these magnitudes even though the analysis makes clear how such estimates can be calculated.
Inefficiency of equilibrium
We give two polar conditions on the technology sets (Yj) which imply that at an equilibrium the production efficiency condition (ii) is generically violated. The first requires that for some firm j the dimension of its production set Yj be L(S + 1): this means that the firm uses as an input or produces as an output each of the L(S + 1) commodities. From a technical point of view this assumption is similar in spirit to the requirement that an agent have a possible endowment of each good.
Theorem 3 (inefficiency).
Zf the assumptions (i) (ACltC3),BCltC2J; (ii) LZ2;
'The model can be extended to include the interests of employees by having consumers and firms choose labor contracts in addition to their consumption-portfolio and production plans [see D&e (1983, 1984) ]. When Kj= RN firm j can completely control its date 1 production vector y{ by suitably changing its production decision yh at date 0. The polar case is to assume that Kj is a subspace of RN generated by the requirement that the composition of date 1 production yi is fixed and only its scale can be influenced by changing the date 0 production decision y',. This leads to the following concept which reduces to the multiplicative uncertainty of Diamond (1967) when L= 1.
Definition 8. Firm j has a ray technology set if there exists a non-zero vector of date 1 commodities (the ray) v{ E RsL and a function hj: RL+R such that
In all genericity arguments of the paper we need a parameter of dimension L(S+ 1) for each firm to perturb its supply function out of non-generic situations. Provided parameters are introduced which permit suj'icient controllability of the supply functions, the particular parametrisation used is not of importance in our analysis. With a general technology set the simplest way to perturb Yj is by introducing an additive parameter (Yj+#). When Yj has the additional structure of being a ray technology set it is natural to replace the additive parameter at date 1 by the ray parameter ~'1 in Definition 8, leaving the date 0 parameter ~'0 to enter additively as before. We will follow this convention in all cases where ray technology sets are introduced. Remark. When all firms have ray technology sets the assumption I + J 2 S + 1 can be dropped because the objective function of each firm does not depend on the distribution of its ownership among its shareholders; thus indeterminacy in the portfolios (0') of the agents does not translate into indeterminacy of the equilibrium. The second result in Theorem 4 is important since it shows that the inefficiency result does not depend on the upper bound on the number of agents.
Example
The simplest class of economies in which the production inefliciencies of the previous section can be explored are those in which production activity consists of using a single input (investment) at date 0 and producing outputs at date 1. In such an economy there are two causes of production inefficiency: inappropriate use of inputs, i.e., under-or overinvestment at date 0 and inappropriate production of outputs, i.e., production of outputs in the wrong proportions across the states at date 1. We shall consider an economy in which only the former type of inefficiency can arise by assuming that there is only one input at date 0 and that the production sector consists of a single firm with a ray technology set.
The basic data of the economy are as follows. There are two consumers (I =2), one firm (J= 1) and two states at date 1 (S=2). There is one good (the input) at date 0 and the two outputs (L=2) in each state at date 1. The characteristics of the two consumers (called 01 and p) are given by separable utility functions ui(xi)=u~(x~)+ c p,u',(xf) Since uf =2logu",, agent /I is more risk averse than agent LX. As we shall see, this induces agent ~1 to become sole owner of the firm. Thus we can think of agent CI as the entrepreneur and agent p as the worker. We assume that the firm has a ray technology set with constant returns to scale h(y,)=y,, n1 = ((b, 0), (LO)). Equilibrium ((X,8, j), (p, Lj, ii)) is given by i"= ( I,(,,-;,2b-;),(;,;) and that t? = l,@ =0 are also the unconstrained optimal choices of CI and /?. Thus the expression for the social welfare change (17) becomes Thus dy, A(a, b) < 0 leads to a marginal gain in social welfare. The parameter space P = {(a, b) E R: + 12b-a>O} is thus partitioned into four disjoint open sets A(a, b)sO in which equilibrium is constrained inefficient, two of overinvestment (a> b, a> 1 and a< b,a< 1) and two of underinvestment (a < b, a > 1 and a > b, a < l), and two closed sets of measure zero A(a, b)=O in which equilibrium satisfies the first-order conditions for constrained efficiency (a = b and a = 1). When a = 1, since r?"=??, the equilibrium is a Pareto optimum.
How do we explain the welfare improving change in investment dy, that a planner can undertake for a given economy (a, b) E P? A marginal change in investment always helps one agent and hurts the other. Thus determining the sign of dy, which leads to a welfare improvement amounts to determining which agent stands to obtain the largest net gain from a change in investment. Reducing (increasing) investment raises (lowers) the price of good 1 relative to good 2 in each state and it is good 1 that the entrepreneur a sells (worker /I buys): thus reducing (increasing) investment helps the entrepreneur (worker). If a# 1 the two terms in (17') have the opposite sign. Thus if the gain to CI exceeds the loss to /? in state 1 then the converse is true in state 2. The sign of a-b determines which of these two terms dominates and hence which agent should be helped. Thus if a> 1 then the gain to a exceeds the loss to /3 in state 1 and if a> b(u< b) this term dominates (is dominated by) the net gain to /I in state 2. Thus social welfare is improved by helping the entrepreneur (the worker), namely by reducing (increasing) investment.
6. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
In view of the short sales constraints the proof can be reduced to an application of Debreu's (1952) social equilibrium existence theorem [see the original working paper (1987) for more details].
Proof of Theorem 2
This theorem is a technical result which ensures that for all but an exceptional set of parameter values equilibria are smooth functions of the parameters. The result is important: the proofs of all the theorems that follow are based upon it. For brevity we have been asked to omit it. A complete proof is in the original working paper (1987); here we provide only an outline. The idea is to employ a Transversality argument to construct an open set of full measure Q in the space of parameters Ryt+J' such that none of the three degenerucies (a)-(c) (see p. 126) can occur.
Step I. We first introduce a procedure for handling the non-smoothness created by the short sales constraints. Consider an artificial portfolio choice 0: arising when agent i is not permitted to invest in a subset of firms indicated by A and is unconstrained in his investment in the remaining firms. Let z&' denote the set of all subsets of pairs (i,j)E{l,...,Z} x{l,...,J} (including the empty set 0) such that A ESZJ implies that for each jE{l,..., J} there exists ie{l,..., 1} such that (i, j) $4 A (for each firm j, some consumer i must be allowed to invest in firm j). The set { jl (i, j) EA} is the set of firms that consumer i is forbidden to invest in. Let A+@: denote a map defined on . An A-equilibrium is a positiue (non-negative) A-equilibrium if 13: >O (eLzO),i=l,..., I. If r = ((X,6 Y), (E 4, E)) is an equilibrium then there exists A ~sd such that 5 is a positive A-equilibrium. It suffices to let A= ((i, j) )8'j=O}. An equilibrium for which the constraints t?j30 begin to be binding for some (i, j) is an equilibrium for which non-differentiability occurs. For such an equilibrium there exist sets A and A with A$a such that 5 is a non-negative A-equilibrium and a positive A-equilibrium.
Step 2. Parameter values (0,~) for which there exist equilibria in which the rank of the returns matrix W is p< J create difficulties since tIi, is not well-defined. By a technique similar to that introduced by Magi11 and Shafer (1989) we write out equations characterizing equilibria of all possible ranks p 5 J and show that with the assumption I + J 5 S + 1 equilibria of rank p <J are exceptional. In an A-equilibrium for which the rank of W is p < J there is a permutation (T of 1,. The choice of 0: is equivalent to the choice of a portfolio y>,,,, in the first p firms of the permutation g. While there may be as many as (J-p) dimensions of 0; that generate a given income stream rni~ RS+I, there is a unique I&,,,, g enerating rni. Thus ~'a,,,, is well-defined. We write out equations characterising such rank p <J equilibria and show that with the assumption I +J g S + 1 the number of independent equations exceeds the number of unknowns. [Note that p(J-p)+Z(J-p) <J(J-p)+Z(J---p)s (S+ l)(J--p).] Thus by a Transversality argument similar to that in Step 4 below we conclude that the set of parameter values for which rank p <J equilibria can occur is a closed set M of measure zero in Ry'vJ) . (This argument is rather long and needs to be done with care.)
Step 3. For each AE~ consider the open set A, ={(p,q,y,o,q) let ?=(x,,,122,s=O,l,. .., S)ER (L-l)(Sfl) denote the truncation of x. If z =(p, q, y,w,q) then for each A E& the equations for full-rank Aequilibria are given by
where e=(l,..., 1) E RJ. We may write the system of equations (18) 
where HA,,.:A>+& x R"'.
We show that H,,,. 40, and conclude by a Transversality argument similar to that in Step 4 below that the set of parameter values for which (19) has a solution is a closed of measure zero Af A,A' in U. Let U'= U\,Y-' where JV'=U_,,~~,~,N~,~,. Then (o,~)E U' implies neither of the degeneracies (a) nor (b) (see p. 126) can occur.
Step 4. We eliminate the critical parameter values (c). Let The result will be proved if we show that generically A-restricted equilibria have distinct E' *,. x RS. In (18') for fixed (o,q) the number of independent equations (dim&) equals the number of independent unknowns: we want to show that adding the S equations GA=0 makes the number of independent equations exceed the number of unknowns. However, we cannot show that rank D,H,= dim&+S.
Since J<S we can show that rank D,H,>, dim& +(S-J) and by the following lemma this will be sufficient. For a proof see Corollary 1, Magi11 and Shafer (1990) . Since by A(z) the indifference surfaces of ui have strictly positive Gaussian curvature for all xi E RN, +, it follows from a theorem in [Mas-Cole11 (1985, p. SO)] that we may without loss of generality assume that D$u'(X') is negative definite. But then there exists dx' satisfying (21). Let us now note that if we let dw'= dx', if (wi +dw') is agent i's endowment then (Xi +dx', 8:, 2 +dA') is the solution of his utility maximising problem. This follows at once from the fact that first (21) We show that the equations of equilibrium and the production efticiency equation ( 
If we show that rank QT = (L -1) S then (24) is satisfied only if v = 0. The key idea is then to use Proposition 3 to show that generically u#O at equilibrium.
Step 2. We show rank QT =(L-1)s. In view of the separability assumption A the equation 2(p,@) =0 decomposes into a pair of equations P($J,, wO) =O, 2, (pl, ei) =O. Differentiating the latter at o =@ and using the fact that pi(w) = p1 gives (25) where esl, RLs is the vector whose component (s, I) is 1 and whose other 1 Since @ is regular the matrix B= [&?,/@J has components are zero. rank&-l)S, so that B 1 is well-defined. Thus (25) Let $-c{l,..., J} denote the subset of firms with ray technology sets and let 9"" denote the remaining firms. Note that for each firm jgF the supply function where /i'j=x!=l B'%, now depends in addition on the ray parameter vi. Since for all agents i such that (i, j) 4 A the no-arbitrage equation holds, it follows that X:=1 $,,,p,~i is independent of i.
As in the proof of Theorem 3 we show that equations of equilibrium and the production efficiency condition (ii) of Proposition 4 are generically not compatible when Y #@. For a firm jeY with ray technology, condition (ii) takes the form Using the notation in (23) this can be written as As usual we show that this condition is not satisfied at positive A-equilibria. Applying
Step 3 in the proof of Theorem 3 we obtain a set sZ* cR~($+~' on which vA(z) # 0 where v,(z)= i ~~l(z)~C~f(Pl,Pl~l?r~l(Z))-~:l(Z)l. and let H,: A,+_& x R be given by HA(z)=(FA(z), GA(z)). We show that generically HA(z) =0 has no solution for each A E&'. The fact that H, $0 will be established if we can show that G, can be perturbed without affecting the equations FA(z) = 0. Consider a perturbation dy{ E RLs satisfying &Odq{=O, dqiTQTv, ~0.
If such a change dq( exists then the objective function of firm j in eq. (27) and the no-arbitrage equation (28) are unchanged. Thus the input decision j$, is unchanged and dfi =dq{ hj(j$ restores equality in (18) (ii)', while dw'; = -Pjdy', compensates for the change in return on firm Js equity. Thus G, is perturbed without affecting the equations FA(z)=O. Note also that this sequence of changes leaves Q(z) and vA(z) unaffected. Equation (29) has a solution if and only if there does not exist a, E RS,a, # 0 such that QTvA =a1 0jl. Thus it suffices to show that a, 0 p1 #Im QT for a, #O. Since Q = B-' C and B is non-singular, Im Q'= Im CT and Im CT = (ker C)'. Note that the vectors of income effects satisfy Cr"=O so that ?EkerC, s=l,..., S. Since ~~. (a,np,) Any transfer of goods among the agents which does not affect their incomes leaves the equations of equilibrium FA(z)=O unchanged but affects the terms wAak). Let z'=(x'-FL). Such transfers can generate any dzi such that @,di. = 0. S' mce the matrix of substitutions result is'implied by the following lemma.
terms is negative definite, the 0 Lemma 2. Let (a,) , k=l,..., n, (bi), i=l,..., I, k=l,..., n be (Z+l)n vectors of R" such that det (a,, . . . , a,) 
If' P(Z) =0 for some 5~ E, then there exists h E E such that DzP(F). h #O.
Proof. By linearity of the determinant with respect to each variable, 
